Conceptions of Climate Change: Conversations with US Conservatives

Abstract

Political analysts, academics, the media, and other nations point to America’s inaction on climate change as a significant deterrent to internationally coordinated mitigation efforts. But meaningful climate change policy is unlikely to be implemented (and is almost certainly unlikely to succeed) in the US without broad public support. Republican lawmakers have traditionally opposed progressive climate change policy, dating back at least two decades (McCright & Dunlap, 2010) to their opposition to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (McCright & Dunlap, 2003), potentially contributing to the difficulty in building public consensus for the policies presumed necessary to avert the worst effects of anthropogenic climate change. Previous examinations of American opinions on climate change have been primarily quantitative in nature, providing a numerical summary of views held but lacking an examination of motivating factors in belief and opinion formation. The current study employs a qualitative method, focus group interviews, to explore these latter elements in the way US conservatives perceive and discuss climate change and related topics, including clean energy technologies, ascription of responsibility for causes and responses to climate change, and the (in)appropriateness of various proposed climate change policy responses. The study finds a wide diversity of views held among focus group participants, contrary to the media’s homogenising treatment of (US) conservatives’ views on the topic, pointing to the potential for consensus building at a local level towards substantive national and international climate change policies. [Abstract reproduced from Appendix I.]

Introduction

Scientific consensus has been established on the anthropogenic origins of worldwide climate changes observed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Cook et al., 2013; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009; IPCC, 2013; Kahan, n.d.; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes, 2004); however, the United States (US) public’s perceptions of both the causes and reality of these changes lag behind the scientific community. Public opinion survey data suggests this lag is particularly evident among US conservatives, whose support for stronger environmental protections generally has declined significantly over the last two decades (Kohut, Doherty, Dimock, & Keeter, 2012), and particularly since ‘Climategate’ (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2012). For policymakers and citizens concerned about continued inaction toward meaningful climate policy, a lack of public support for climate-change policy makes action politically difficult.

The news media have taken note of conservative US lawmakers’ reluctance to embrace progressive climate policy. Consequently, politically conservative Americans, and members of the Republican Party in particular, have often been painted with a broad brush regarding their views on climate change[1], perhaps due at least partly to a conflation of US Republican lawmakers’ public statements with the views of the general population of US conservatives. Although conservative political views are correlated with higher incidences of scepticism towards the findings of climate science and opposition to national and international climate policy responses in the US (Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, Howe, Maibach, & Feinberg, 2013), two principle findings of the present study are that the complex circumstances and beliefs that underpin conservatives’ views on climate change are more nuanced and that the variety of their views on the issue is far from homogenous, despite their portrayal in the media (see Kuypers (2002) for more on media bias).

One potential explanation for the broad depiction US conservatives’ scepticism towards climate change science is a bias in the media. An illustrative example of the politicisation of the climate change discussion in the US media is an article first published on Bloomberg View under the title ‘Changing Americans' Minds on Climate Change’ (Flavelle, 2014a), then syndicated and republished the next day in the Salt Lake Tribune (a newspaper with the reputation of leaning liberal in the strongly conservative state of Utah) under the title ‘Flavelle: Why Republicans are blind to climate change’ (Flavelle, 2014b). Such editorial politicisation removes the public one step further from the findings of peer-reviewed research, adding another layer for potential confusion on the part of lay society. If any section of US society is blind to climate change, the media might again be playing a role. For example, Antilla (2005) found, in a study of 255 newspapers, that ‘articles that framed climate change in terms of debate, controversy, or uncertainty were plentiful’ (p. 350), although Boykoff (2007) suggests such articles are becoming less common. Despite the consensus among climate scientists referenced above, to a non-technical public, the media’s framing of climate change and its science could lead to misconceptions about the extent of scientific consensus on the issue.

However, despite stereotypes in the media (such as the Flavelle article cited above), and despite the public denial of climate science on the part of Republican lawmakers, there is evidence to suggest the views of everyday Americans who identify as Republican or conservative vary widely. A 2013 Pew Research poll, for example, suggests Republicans and independents who lean Republican are roughly equally divided among four groups of varying acceptance of global warming’s existence and causes (Pew Research, 2013), suggesting many conservatives stand at odds with the views expressed by Republican Party leaders (Maibach et al., 2013) at the national level. Moreover, although many Republican lawmakers publicly deny the findings of climate science, emerging evidence suggests this could be for political rather than scientific reasons (Adragna, 2014).

Literature Review

Studying US perceptions of climate change

Significant quantitative research efforts have been dedicated to measuring US opinions on environmental issues generally (Kohut et al., 2012) as well as more particularly on climate change (Ipsos Mori, 2014; Leiserowitz et al., 2013; Roser-Renouf, Stenhouse, Rolfe-Redding, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2014), through large-sample, representative public-opinion surveys. Such research has provided valuable information for environment-conscious citizens and policymakers. For example, (Leiserowitz et al., 2013) classify Americans into six broad categories according to factors such as their acceptance of climate change science and their support for various policy proposals in response to climate change. This provides information to policymakers and opinion leaders to tailor messages specifically for different segments of the population rather than pursue a single communication strategy that might not resonate as well with certain subsections of the population.

However, one potential gap of such studies is inherent in their methodology. Despite asking many—sometimes hundreds of—detailed questions, opinion surveys do not allow respondents to express their opinions fully as both the questions asked and the list of available responses are predetermined by the researchers. In addition, respondents might not have given the topic sufficient thought (Kempton, 1997) and feel pressured to choose from one of the provided answers. For these reasons, survey methodologies may lead to overconfidence in the fidelity of the results to the reality of the manner in which climate change is conceptualised and discussed among respondents. If, for example, a respondent’s opinion falls outside the purview of any of the questions asked or outside one of the available answers, her views on the issue are unlikely to be captured in the research and reported in its results. Additionally, efforts to compartmentalise opinions, such as the suggestion that climate change opinions in the US can be neatly summarised into six (or any number) ‘Americas’ (Leiserowitz et al., 2013) risk being overly stylised or reductionist. This is not to say that such segmentation is not useful (it almost certainly is, especially compared to treating an entire nation as one homogenous whole), it is only to emphasise that there are likely more than six American views on climate change.

This last observation provided the impetus for undertaking this research. When asked open-ended questions and allowed to explain their views (and their motivations for holding those views) on climate change, how would US conservatives respond? Would they respond as a homogenous group, in chorus with the opinions expressed by Republican Party leaders at the national level and the stereotypical personifications of the national media? Would they respond in line with Leiserowitz et al.’s six Americas? Or would their responses highlight an even greater diversity of views? With these questions in mind, the present study relies on data collected in a series of focus groups, a qualitative method ideally suited for eliciting public opinion (Gaskell, 2000). As Kitzinger (1995) explains, ‘Questionnaires are more appropriate for obtaining quantitative information and explaining how many people hold a certain (pre-defined) opinion; focus groups are better for exploring exactly how those opinions are constructed’ (p. 302). Thus, by allowing respondents a broader range of responses and through analysing those responses qualitatively, the findings of this study complement the extensive quantitative research already undertaken to provide a more complete picture of US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change, with the added value of ‘exploring exactly how those opinions are constructed’ (ibid.) in greater detail than is available through quantitative research methods alone.

Among US conservatives

Climate change opinions specifically among US conservatives have been studied in a variety of efforts, but such studies have been almost entirely quantitative in nature. For example, in a study of climate change perceptions among conservatives in Nevada, Liu, Smith, & Safi (2013) state that ‘focus group interviews can provide more in-depth insight regarding climate change perception’ (p. 314) but ultimately opt for a survey methodology, claiming that ‘the [focus group] interviews are usually confined to local levels with a limited sample size’ (ibid.); however, as discussed above, this is not a reason to reject the methodology outright.

In another study, the aforementioned stereotypes in the media of conservatives are in part explained (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). The authors studied 10 years of public opinion surveys and found white, conservative males were most likely to deny the findings of climate science. This is corroborated in (Leiserowitz et al., 2013)’s six Americas’ ‘Dismissive’ classification, who skew white, male, educated, and wealthy (Roser-Renouf et al., 2014). Again, however, the research is based on public opinion surveys, which struggle to allow for detailed expressions and justifications of opinion.

Focus group studies on public opinions of climate change (in the US and elsewhere)

Despite focus groups’ having ‘reemerged as a popular technique for gathering qualitative data, both among sociologists and across a wide range of academic and applied research areas’ (Morgan, 1996:129), relatively few studies have used this method to examine climate change perceptions, and coverage has been sporadic, particularly in the US. This is somewhat of a surprise given the methodology’s strengths in eliciting opinions and examining how ideas are formed and discussed. Examples of studies on climate change using focus groups in the US include Schnepf, Creighton, Grotta, & Kantor (2011), who reported findings of focus groups conducted in Idaho to study the ‘knowledge, attitudes, and educational needs regarding climate change and potential forest management consequences’ (p. 3) of forest landowners. Carmin & Dodman (2013) report on findings of focus groups conducted with urban planners in large cities globally, including in the United States. And a 1999 Public Agenda report used focus groups to study opinions on a series environmental topics, of which climate change was only one (Immerwahr, 1999). This last study, similarly to the present study, adopted a geographically diverse approach, holding focus groups in locations around the US.

As climate change has become such a partisan issue, this lack of attention afforded the methodology could be due to a resistance to the use of focus groups as a method of studying opinion on the part of some conservative elected officials. For example, according to Kempton (1997), '...some members of Congress consider focus groups to be a way of "promoting a leftists agenda" among the public. In fact, these members of Congress were already bringing agency and department heads to task on the matter' (p. 19). In an apparent contradiction to the quotation in Kempton’s assertion above (which presumably originated from someone on the right opposing the promotion of ‘“…a leftists agenda”’ (ibid.)), Frank Luntz’s (in)famous climate memo (The Luntz Research Companies, 2002) to President George W. Bush’s administration was likely based on extensive focus group research; however, the results of that research are not publicly available.

Outside the US, examples of focus group studies examining climate change opinions are somewhat more prevalent, although as a research method they remain comparatively underrepresented. Some examples include Becken (2007), where focus groups were held with frequent travellers in an international airport in New Zealand to discuss the climate impacts of air travel. Becken found that people were unlikely to change travel behaviour and even engaged in attempts to justify their travel habits (or even felt entitled to them). Another example is Mertz, Mbow, Reenberg, & Diouf (2009) who combined individual and group interviews to investigate farmers’ perceptions of climate change and its local impacts in the rural Sahel savannah of Senegal. Boon (2014) used a multi-method approach including a demographic study, focus groups, and a survey to examine individual and community resilience following flooding in a small Australian town. Horton & Doron (2011) used focus groups to examine the effect on lay citizens in the United Kingdom (UK) of adopting a perspective of fairness when considering climate change, and Butler & Pidgeon (2009) used focus groups to examine the influence of media on public perceptions of climate change in the UK.

In what perhaps most closely reflects the research design and aims of the present study, Wibeck (2014) conducted focus groups in Sweden to determine whether the public viewed climate change as ‘local or distant, gradual or catastrophic’ (p. 204) and found that Swedes view the issue as global, distant, gradual, and out of their control. Leiserowitz (2005, 2006) came to similar conclusions about Americans’ risk perceptions with regards to climate change, although he used a quantitative research method. Further, Wibeck (2014) finds that, ‘Using prototypical examples and metaphorical descriptions as communicative resources, participants constructed, modified, and negotiated their understanding of climate change’ (p. 214). Wibeck’s findings are largely reflected in the outcome of the present study of US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change, with some important differences as described in the ‘discussion’ section below.

Research Design and Methods

This section first describes two distinctions made in establishing the parameters of the study. The first regards the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’; the second is on the decision to study US conservatives as a group rather than members of the Republican Party. Following these distinctions, the selection and use of focus groups as a research methodology in the present study are justified, with discussions on group dimensions, participant selection, location, question formation, and ethical concerns.

‘Climate change’ versus ‘global warming’

On the use of ‘climate change’ rather than ‘global warming’ in question framing, Akerlof & Maibach (2011) conclude: ‘Global warming appears to be a more polarizing term than climate change’ (p. 699), while Leiserowitz et al. (2014) posit that ‘global warming generates stronger feelings of negative affect…among Republicans’ (p. 5, emphasis in original; see also (Leiserowitz, 2005)) than does ‘climate change’. Moreover, climate scientists often use ‘climate change’ to refer to the more diverse set of climatic changes that result from increasing concentrations of atmospheric GHGs. As the goal of this study was to explore perceptions of the broader issue (and not just increasing temperatures) as well as, to a certain extent, to examine the way the term ‘climate change’ is understood among US conservatives, ‘climate change’ was used throughout the research process in interactions with research participants. (Interestingly, however, participants often used the term ‘global warming’ in their responses, even though questions were framed in terms of ‘climate change’, suggesting the terms might not be that different in their minds.)

‘Conservatives’ rather than ‘Republicans’

Many studies discuss both Republicans and conservatives together, perhaps in part due to the constantly changing figure of the percentage of the US population identifying specifically as ‘Republican’. In 2013, this figure reached the lowest point since Gallup began a regular survey 25 years ago; meanwhile, Americans identifying as independents reached an all-time high of 46% in the fourth quarter of 2013, significantly larger both than those identifying as Democrat (29%) or Republican (22%) (Jones, 2014). Thus, in the context of such a low (and constantly fluctuating) percentage of Americans identifying specifically as Republican but still 41% identifying as either Republican or Republican-leaning independent at the end of 2013 (ibid.), and with the precedent of previous research’s treatment of Republicans and Republican-leaning conservatives together (e.g., see Maibach et al. (2013)), this research focuses on conservatives’ conceptions of climate change.

On using focus groups

The selection of focus groups as a research method was driven by the specific goals of the research: namely, to delve deeper into the way conservatives perceive and discuss (Gaskell, 2000; Kitzinger, 1995) climate change rather than just to discover what they currently think about it, which has been researched elsewhere (e.g., see Maibach et al. (2013)). The aim of the present study is to explore the thought processes and rhetorical techniques US conservatives employ when thinking, talking, and forming opinions about climate change. Focus groups have the advantage of helping elicit opinion and allowing a freer forum for expressing complex and original points of view (Gaskell, 2000; Kitzinger, 1995) and were thus a logical choice given this research’s aims.

Group dimensions

Recommendations vary for number of participants per focus group; for example, Kitzinger (1995) states that ‘[t]he ideal group size is between four and eight people’ (p. 301), while Lunt & Livingstone (1996) believe there is ‘a consensus that 6 to 10 group members works best’ (p. 7); Morgan (1996) agrees with Lunt & Livingstone in number and further recommends gathering homogenous participants. The focus groups in the present study averaged five participants each, which allowed responses from most or all participants on each question.

Recommendations also vary on the number of focus groups that should be conducted for a given study but range from a minimum of two per sub-segment or ‘strata’ (Bauer & Aarts, 2000:32) of the population studied to a maximum expectation of six to eight per study for a single researcher (Gaskell, 2000). Morgan (1996)’s ‘…rule of thumb is that most projects consist of four to six focus groups’ (p. 144). Additionally, Morgan (1996) and other qualitative research design guidance (Eliot & Associates, 2005; Gaskell, 2000) recommend conducting additional focus groups until the point of ‘saturation’, or the point when the marginal return on conducting an additional focus group in terms of producing novel responses is low or zero. As the present study did not specifically set out to compare different strata (e.g., gender, age, education level, or geographies) but rather looks for general observations about US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change, a total of four focus groups was determined to strike an appropriate balance between research constraints and sufficient data in order to avoid the ‘data dungeons’ described by Gaskell (2000): ‘materials collected but never really analysed’ (p. 34).

Participant selection methods and potential for bias

The main criterion for participation in the focus groups was self-identified political philosophy: this research explores conservatives’ conceptions of climate change. As such, only those who self-identified as having conservative political views (often as evidenced by formal affiliation with or a past voting record favouring the Republican Party) were permitted to participate in the focus groups. Participants were identified and selected through a combination of two methods. The first was convenience. Members of the researcher’s personal network helped recruit participants and in some cases even participated themselves in the focus groups. The second method was via online and in-person solicitations of members of the public. This involved working with local organisations such as the chamber of commerce and local Republican Party organisers in the towns and cities where the focus groups were held to identify potential participants.

Each of these two selection methods introduces the potential for bias. Members of the researcher’s personal network who identify as politically conservative may or may not have given much thought to the topic of climate change and hence may or may not have had well-reasoned or strong opinions on the issue one way or another, whereas those who self-selected to participate as a result of public solicitations likely already had a pre-existing interest in the issue. This might especially be the case since no compensation was offered for participation. This combination of participants potentially without strong or well-considered positions and those who have already taken an interest in and formed an opinion on the topic might have increased the chance of ‘risky shift’, whereby the groups’ conclusions and consensuses become more extreme (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Greater resources, such as additional researchers and funding to compensate participants, might have allowed for improved selection methods and thus potentially less-biased results.

Location

As the aim of the present study was better to understand US conservatives’ climate change perceptions generally (rather than in a specific region) locations for the four focus groups were chosen in different parts of the country and in states with a variety of profiles. Location selection was also influenced by convenience and the researcher’s personal network; nevertheless, the locations selected for research do have certain distinguishing features providing diversity. The four locations selected were in Connecticut, Florida, Utah, and Colorado. The Connecticut focus group took place in a shop in a small town. The Florida focus group was held in a house in a suburb to one of Florida’s coastal metropolitan areas. The Utah and Colorado focus groups were held on a university campus and in a house, respectively, both in a mid-sized cities. The politics of the states selected are also varied: Connecticut is predominantly moderate, politically progressive, and swings almost invariably Democrat in elections. Florida and Colorado are both mixed bags politically and are often labelled ‘swing states’. Utah, on the other hand, consistently ranks as one of the most conservative states in the US and invariably votes Republican (see Swift (2014) for information on state political leanings). Geographically, the states are also different: Connecticut is hilly, wooded, and temperate with considerable annual precipitation; Florida is flat, hot, and prone to tropical storms; and Utah and Colorado are both mountainous and dry, prone to forest fires, heat waves, and blizzards. These geographic and climatological variations affect daily and seasonal perceptions of weather and climate and associated risks to livelihood and property (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006).

Topic selection and question formation

Questions were focused on topics of general academic interest regarding climate change and ancillary topics, including climate change communication, science, and potential societal and policy responses, and were written to be open-ended enough to allow free expression of opinions. Questions were condensed to a ‘topic guide’ (Gaskell, 2000:40), which is included as Appendix IV. Finally, a practice group discussion was held with interested members of the researcher’s personal network to test the interview format, length, questions, and recording equipment.

Research ethics

As the focus groups conducted for the present study involved human participants and a potentially contentious and politicised discussion topic, measures were taken to ensure the research met ethical standards for informed consent, anonymity, and integrity. For details on research ethics for this study, see Appendix III.

Results and Analysis

This section reports in two parts the findings of the four focus groups conducted for the present study. As the primary unit of analysis in focus group studies is at the group rather than the individual level (Gaskell, 2000), a summary of the primary group-level results are reported in Table 1 below. The questions asked varied only slightly from group to group, enabling comparison among the groups. Following the table, the second part of this section compares and contrasts themes identified through traditional qualitative analysis of the transcripts of focus group participants’ responses, which can be found in their entirety in the Appendix V.

Table 1 – Consensus and discussion points in four focus groups with US conservatives

Table 1: Summarised findings from the four focus groups conducted for the present study. The first column contains shorthand summaries identifying the questions, the second and third columns identify group location and whether consensus was reached, and the fourth column summarises either the consensus view or the primary opposing views. The full questions and transcript of participants’ responses can be found in Appendices IV and V.

General impressions and group dynamics

Despite attempts to assemble focus groups of homogenous participants (see Morgan (1996)), a wide variety of views were expressed on most questions. Consensus proved elusive on at least some questions in most of the groups, with each group taking on a different dynamic. The Connecticut and Utah focus groups often struggled to achieve consensus, whereas the Florida and Colorado groups tended to agree more readily and for longer portions of the discussion.

The Connecticut, Florida, and Utah focus groups all had at least one participant to whose work one or more of the focus group questions applied directly (renewable energy industry executive (CT01) and insurance industry professional (CT03), mayor of coastal town threatened by climate change (FL01), and former climate scientist (UT03) and Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certified construction specialist (UT04)), and these participants’ perspectives helped shape the discussions in their groups. In Connecticut, for example, although both CT01 and CT03 were sceptical of the findings of climate science, they were both aware of how it affected their work. In Florida, FL01 talked about the experience of working with other officials at the local and county level, many of whom were Republicans, who fully accepted the findings of climate science. In Utah, UT03—who remained sceptical of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s ability to make sweeping claims—provided an insider’s perspective into climate science research and the scientific method more generally, whereas UT04’s contributions were more of a practical nature. The Colorado focus group, which did not have a participant so directly implicated in any of the focus group questions, seemed to participate more equally and be more accepting of each other’s responses, even when they did not express similar views.

Common themes across groups

Several common themes and rhetorical strategies emerged across the groups. Excerpts from the transcripts of participants’ responses are included here to provide evidence of the themes identified. Quotes selected are meant to be representative of the consensus view that was either shared by other group members or went unchallenged. As such, they can be viewed as the voice of the group rather than limited to the individuals who made the specific comments. In some cases, exchanges with multiple participants are included to highlight diverging opinions held in a group. Such instances are identified prior to each excerpt.

First thoughts varied and set the tone

The first question in each focus group invited participants to share their immediate reactions to the words ‘climate change’. In the Connecticut and Utah focus groups, responses to this first question varied widely, with views ranging from complete denial of climate science to complete acceptance of it, with an array of views in between in each case. The Florida and Colorado groups both reached consensus accepting the findings of climate science. These initial expressions were largely indicative of the level of consensus achieved on questions throughout the remainder of the discussions.

Images of climate change were distant, regional, and local

Participants were also prompted to think of images that came to mind upon hearing the words ‘climate change’. Participants identified distant (glaciers melting, polar bears, India, China, Peru), regional (Yellowstone National Park, California), and local (flooding, sea-level rise, forest fires, and weather patterns) images. Distant images were common to all groups, but regional and local images were specific to group location.

Discussions with others on climate change varied widely

The second question asked participants to think about a conversation in which they had participated where climate change was discussed. This question had the benefit of introducing outside opinions for discussion in each group, serving as a multiplier of opinions expressed. Within each group, experiences varied widely. For example, the Florida participants shared experiences of discussions with family (FL02) and with the public (FL01). Utah participants also spoke with family members (UT01, UT05) but spoke with work colleagues (UT03, UT04) as well. Colorado participants’ experiences included discussion with colleagues (CO02) but also included discussions on social media (CO01) and with friends (CO04). The results participants reported of such discussions also varied but included ideological dismissal of climate science (UT01), scientific challenges to climate science (CO02, UT03, UT04), and choosing selectively with whom to discuss climate science (FL01, UT05).

Views on climate science varied widely

As alluded to in the previous sections, participants’ views on climate science reached from one end of the spectrum to the other, spanning rejection (CT01, UT01), uncertainty (CT03, UT02, UT03, UT04, CO02), acceptance (CT04, CT05, FL01, FL02, UT05, CO01, CO03, CO04, CO05), and, at times, even conspiracy (CT01, CT02, CT03, UT01, UT02, UT05). An exchange among four participants in the Utah focus group demonstrates the diverse views held in the group:

UT02: ‘…I don’t think it’s as extreme as they’re saying it is. Where I’m from, it’s been one of the coldest years we’ve had….’

UT05: ‘Notice this is one of those classic situations where if you don’t believe in climate change, you can say, “Ha, this weather is really cold, there must be no global warming,” and if you do believe in climate change you can say, “Ha, this is extreme weather, there must be global warming,” right? …’

UT01: ‘Well this idea that global warming can cause really cold weather or really hot weather, or really wet weather or really dry weather, it’s the philosophy of a madman.’

UT03: ‘Well, climate and weather are two different things.…And so even though it might be raining today, that doesn’t change the fact that we live in an arid climate….’

A similar lack of consensus pervaded the Connecticut focus group. In Florida and Colorado, however, there was a greater level of consensus, with both groups coming to the conclusion that climate change exists and is likely human induced.

Science and ‘science-y’ speech

Participants appealed to scientific and scientific-sounding lines of reasoning to justify their views, and these appeals can be broken down into two main categories: appeals to scientific authority and appeals to ‘common-sense science’, both of which were used to support and refute the consensus view of climate scientists.

Appeals to scientific authority

Appeals to the authority of science included both references to scientific literature and to people with scientific credentials, who in some case were participants’ personal acquaintances. Below are some examples from the focus groups.

In favour of the scientific consensus:

FL02: ‘…the melting glaciers…this has been very clearly documented on a global basis.'

UT05: ‘...the consensus of smart people who do have [climate change] expertise seems to be that this exists and that it’s a problem....'

Questioning or opposing the scientific consensus:

UT03: 'I don’t know how the IPCC can claim to have such solid knowledge that they’ve found, because there’s millions and millions of pages of journal articles on research on the topic….’

CT01: '…one of the original founders of Greenpeace…just said it’s all a bunch of voodoo science and foolishness….And there’s 31,000…recognized experts in the field who’ve signed a document to say….there’s no firm science….’

‘Common-sense science’

A second way in which scientific-sounding arguments were used is what this study calls ‘common-sense science’. These are arguments based on fundamental principles of science that the participant feels should be obvious to everyone. Such arguments were used both to support and oppose the consensus view of climate scientists.

In favour of scientific consensus:

CO04: ‘You can’t right now deny that the climate is changing, because absolutely anyone can see that.’ (C003 agreed.)

Questioning or opposing scientific consensus:

CT01: 'But a single large volcano exploding is more than the entire human race has put into the environment since we crawled out of caves. And those are going off all over the place around the world all the time.’

CT03: 'It’s not—the hypothesis [of climate science] is not falsifiable. So it’s really not science. You can’t say in 30 years or 50 years, right now, whether or not the climate will change. That’s in the future.’

UT01: ‘...in this place, it’s the hottest it’s ever been. But like, on the same day, it’s the coldest it’s ever been in a different place. And so I guess, it’s a big earth, somewhere it’s going to be the hottest it’s ever been and the coldest it’s ever been just based on the law of large numbers. It doesn’t prove anything.’

Politicisation of climate change and climate change science

Although there was only one question (the final main question) that intentionally turned the discussion towards politics, participants in each focus group viewed climate change through a political lens, and politics was a theme that permeated responses to many questions. This was apparent from participants’ responses to the first question and throughout the remainder of the discussions in each group.

All members of the Utah focus group weighed in on the politicisation of climate change:

UT01: 'I think [climate change] is something that is fabricated by the left…'

UT03: ‘…it’s hard for conservatives to see it for what it is, because it’s been completely politicised.’

UT05: ‘…there is a real political problem in our inability to deal with it, and then there’s an ideological, partisan problem in the way the left has seized on the issue…to bring about political outcomes that they already support for entirely unrelated reasons.’

UT02: ‘Liberals just want more control in the government’s hands….’

UT04: 'I think a lot of times people are out there just skimming the numbers that help [their own] opinion….’

While the Utah focus group largely made the science a topic for partisan debate, the Colorado focus group distinguished between politics and science:

CO01: ‘...”global warming” to me is more of a…political football to gain political advantage, to win votes….[W]e have to separate that from the actuality of the climate actually changing.’

CO02: ‘Part of me thinks that yes, some of this is very political….But another part of me says yeah, this is a real thing, and we need to wake up and take a look at it.’

In Connecticut, the discussion was more about the politicisation of science in institutions, such as government and academia. An exchange among CT01, CT02, and CT03 reveals their agreement on the issue:

CT01: ‘It’s where the money comes from.’

CT03: ‘It’s where the money comes from, and it’s this conflict of ethics and interest, and just the bias, I—even if they mean well, they’re biased.’

CT01: ‘It’s the very best science money can buy. And God help you if you come up with the wrong answer, because you won’t get that next grant. If your science happens to disprove something?’

CT03: ‘Yeah, I mean []’

CT01: ‘Put it on the shelf, and don’t publish it, because, just tell them I didn’t want, you know, I need my next grant, so I can finish it, or change it, or make it come out for the right answer. You know, like you say, it’s careers, made or lost []’

CT02: ‘Absolutely.’

CT01: ‘[] by being in the right answer department.’

Despite viewing the issue as political, participants in two focus groups perceived a recent turn in public opinion on climate change in last few years:

FL02: '...the central focus is shifting to: is it irreversible, or is it reversible? Can something be done about it?’

FL01: 'I think that tipping point that you describe about sensibilities is, as I see it, is about, maybe three years old. So the propensity to deny the science with ostensibly plausible science and counterpoint is invisible, except in the farthest reaches of far-right crazy land, in my view.’

CO02: 'Just in the last year, I’d say, I’m starting to see people read through the different positions and starting to come more towards the centre....'

FL01 indicated that in their community, the issue was less partisan.

FL01: 'I brought [climate change] up a couple years ago at our…State of the Village message….And the response was perfect, I mean, perfect in the sense of understanding, shared concern, so there was no Republican-versus-other-people animus associated with this issue at all.’

‘Science aside…’

Despite some participants’ rejection or scepticism of climate science, they nevertheless remained open to the idea of climate-friendly actions. In some cases, statements supporting climate-friendly actions immediately followed or were linked to messages rejecting climate science or couched in political statements:

CT01: 'There’s a lot of good reasons for us to be smarter about our resources and clean up our air….Global warming is not it.’

CT03: ‘…I don’t really think it matters that much whether we’re huge contributors to global warming or climate change, we still have to be prepared, and what we can do to prepare ourselves is other things besides the current prescriptions.’

UT04: ‘...if we can be a little bit more efficient...then let’s go for it, there’s benefits regardless of climate change.'

These ‘science aside’ arguments allow room for discussion about climate change policy solutions irrespective of accepting climate science.

Broad support for clean energy

The question on clean energy elicited broad support. After largely rejecting the scientific consensus on climate change, the Connecticut focus group shifted tone with the question on clean energy. After describing several recent innovations in renewable energy technology, CT01 concluded: 'You know, nobody thought you could stair step [clean energy] technology. Well they have in the last decade. It amazes me and I’m in the business.’

Natural gas was brought up and discussed in two focus groups as a potential transition fuel to a cleaner energy future.

CT01: 'Natural gas. We’ve got it in abundance. We’re the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.’

FL02: 'The major petroleum companies are thinking about alternative sources of energy, namely using natural gas, and shale gas, as an interim measure….'

But hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, was debated in the Connecticut focus group, where participants sparred over whether fracking is safe.

The discussion in Utah was more complex. To paraphrase a lengthy exchange there, UT01 and UT02 began by expressing general support for energy efficiency and general environmental protection measures. Next, although UT03 expressed confidence in the greening of business and new clean energy solutions, UT04 suggested caution to avoid feedback or rebound effects. UT05 adopted a more pessimistic and suspect tone, suggesting that an entire industry dependent on government subsidies and tax credits was being created and wondered if the interests of funding-dependent entities might be motivating the promotion of what UT05 referred to as ’the cult of the environment’: essentially, if people fear climate change, they will continue to fund this new climate change industry through tax expenditures, so the newly minted climate change industry has an incentive to promote fear of climate change.

The consensus in Colorado can be summed up in one participant’s comment: 'I’m a proponent of alternative energy. I mean obviously, if there’s a way we can harness the wind, or solar power, or—we’d be foolish not to do it’ (CO01). The Colorado focus group also believed clean energy technology will likely need to flow from the industrialised nations to developing nations:

CO01: ‘...it has to be more affordable, because you can’t take an electric vehicle that costs $80,000 and go into a country like China or India, or…another third-world country and expect people to say, “…we’ll spring for an $80,000 car” when all they make is $5 a day….So it’s obviously in the industrialized countries—that’s where it has to begin.’

CO02: 'We have to take into account that our world is all over the place. The people in Peru probably don’t even know what solar energy panels are.’

Correspondingly, the Connecticut focus group brought up the flow of European engineering technology into China, and the Florida focus group talked about the leadership role participants felt the West needs to play in international progress on climate change. This West-centric theme seems to suggest a worldview that assumes solutions are less likely to come from the developing world, although the Connecticut focus group did talk about potential leapfrogging technologies in the developing world. The principle beliefs remained, however, that these technologies would flow from the developed to developing world.

A primary role for—and general faith in—private-sector and individual responses to climate change

Some general preferences for private-sector and individual responses emerged throughout the groups; however, opinions on this last topic also ranged broadly, with roles perceived for individuals, businesses, governments, and international organisations. The optimistic shift in tone in Connecticut continued as the discussion progressed to discussions of societal responses to climate change. The Connecticut group was simultaneously confident in and sceptical of the private sector’s ability to respond to climate change, pointing both to conflicting interests of long-term environmental goals and 90-day business reporting cycles, as well as to the importance of profit motivation in developing new technologies. They remained sceptical of government solutions:

CT02: 'I don’t think the government should be handing out buckets [of money]…to their so-called buddies in the business that are going to do energy efficient things or clean energy companies or something like that. I don’t trust them to begin with. I don’t care what side of the aisle they’re on.'

CT03: ‘...if we’re going to be saved, I think it will be through …private industry…and…they have to see a profit somewhere…. [T]hat profit will be through an unfettered market.’

CT03: ‘Responding to climate change requires flexibility; regulation hampers flexibility.’

The Florida focus group’s recommended solutions were more centred on public-sector and international responses to climate change, but also on opportunities for individuals to play a role:

FL01: 'I absolutely see the need for a global agreement. It’s a global issue.'

FL01: ‘ ...active populism influences local elected officials and, by extension, larger governmental entities.’

In Utah, the group believed the public sector had a role to play, but, as UT03 put it, ‘...if there’s a nongovernmental solution, let’s try that first.' Colorado saw roles for individuals, businesses, governments, and international organisations but assigned primary roles to individuals and businesses:

CO02: ‘...you’re going to see the bigger changes quicker through businesses than government and world organizations, but you’re going to see the long-lasting survivability of our planet when the individual gets involved through everything.’

CO03: ‘...it falls on everyone, if you—if you live on this planet you should care, in some way, about your planet and how you’re leaving it, you know, for the next generation. But I also think it will take longer individually, and businesses or governments maybe have more influence at this time.’

CO05: ‘...bigger groups [such as international organisations] have authority and...the capability to actually do something immediately about it, and so I think that they have a greater responsibility to actually meet together and actually talk about it and try and force different things that we do, and I think that middle level—the government, that they can do things about it. But I think what it comes down to is every individual.’

CO01: 'I think businesses have a majority responsibility….’

Different policy solutions were also discussed in most of the focus groups, with participants expressing support for a carbon tax, cap-and-trade scheme, an international agreement, and stricter environmental regulations generally. Although individuals disagreed about which portfolio of policies might work best, the general level of support suggests debate and discussion could lead to consensus or a compromise.

Discussion

The groups’ primary conclusions on the existence or nonexistence of climate change (a mix of acceptance/rejection (Connecticut and Utah) and acceptance (Florida and Colorado)) stand at odds with the at-times-homogenising media portrayals of US conservatives as being guilty of climate-change denial as a group. This tendency might be due at least partially to an unconscious conflation of US conservatives’ views with public statements made by Republican lawmakers at a national level; however, given Congress’s low approval rating, such an assumption is unlikely to be accurate. (Moreover, Republican lawmakers might not even hold views matching their public statements (see Adragna (2014)).) As evidence, the diversity of views held and expressed by the US conservatives who participated in the present study’s focus groups exceeds the oft-denialist talking points of Republican lawmakers at the national level.

The findings of this research do not suggest that the stereotypical views ascribed to US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change were absent from the discussions, only that, when expressed, those views were often challenged or turned out to be more nuanced—or their motivations better reasoned—than their summary dismissals suggest. In addition, the wide range of views expressed, additional topics and perspectives brought up, and rhetorical tools employed in the focus groups suggest participants were able to approach the subject from a variety of perspectives. These findings should be encouraging for climate-conscious citizens and policymakers as they demonstrate room for discussion, debate, and consensus building, particularly at local levels.

Contextualising the findings

Another observation of potential interest to the climate conscious comes from a combination of points described in the ‘Results and Analysis’ section above. Returning to a comment made by CT03: ‘...if we’re going to be saved, I think it will be through technical solutions, and those are best done by private industry…’—the first phrase, ‘…if we’re going to be saved…’, marks a departure from the serious doubts about the scientific diagnosis of climate change this same participant had expressed earlier in the focus group. CT03’s comments suggest a belief that climate change is a real threat, but that private business solutions are the answer, rather than a government-backed solution. Once discussion of a private-sector, technology-based solution was introduced (clean energy technology), CT01, who was also dismissive of climate science early in the focus group, was likewise optimistic regarding businesses’ ability to rise to challenges posed by environmental issues, even conceding that the energy industry was ‘rightly’ targeted for its dirty coal plants’ contributions to environmental problems. Immediately following this concession, however, CT01 proceeded to decry the government’s lack of an energy policy and laud private industry’s comparatively superior management capabilities. These (albeit minor) concessions on climate science in exchange for rhetorical ground on private-sector over public-sector solutions perhaps betray a deeper-seated political concern suggested elsewhere in the focus groups: UT05’s assertion that ‘the left has seized on the issue…to bring about political outcomes that they already support for entirely unrelated reasons’; namely, more government power.

This sentiment is also apparent in the concern of CO01 (who also recommended a primary role for business in responding to climate change): ‘So I’m really concerned—something has to be done, obviously, but I’m just concerned about centralising that authority in just a few people…’, which, to CO01, was ‘frankly what our [US] founders…were against’. In addition, there is UT03’s preference for nongovernmental solutions. A similar strategy is reflected in the ‘science aside…’ arguments cited above, where participants were open to discussions of increasing environmental protections, as long as such discussions were not premised on the findings of climate science.

All these findings suggest some focus group participants’ reluctance to accept the consensus of climate science might have been out of concern that doing so would provide too strong a tool to their political opponents to achieve their political goals, rather than out of any defensible criticisms of climate science. However, once a private-sector solution was introduced, participants could surrender ground on climate science in exchange for a position on private-sector solutions.

By distinguishing between impact science (measuring environmental impacts of, for example, industry) and production science (science that leads to products), McCright & Dunlap (2010) suggest that US conservatives’ reluctance to accept climate science (an impact science) while simultaneously freely accepting the science underlying modern technological innovations (production science) might have more to do with their general suspicion of the public-sector institutionalisation of impact science by government and academia—of which conservatives are already likely to be suspicious—as compared to the private-sector institutionalisation of production science by businesses—in which conservatives traditionally place more confidence. Such an understanding pushes climate science towards the realm of ‘post-normal climate science’ (Krauss, Schäfer, & von Storch, 2012) (p. 121), which could be a nonstarter for meaningful political discussion. However, it also raises the question of whether US conservatives’ scepticism of climate science might be associated more with opposition to certain institutions rather than with the science itself.

In an idealised world, people of all political persuasions might accept climate science as ‘normal’ ((Kuhn, 1962), cited in (Krauss et al., 2012:123)) science—regardless of the person who conducted the research or the institution that funded it—evaluating the science on its merits. But given the complexities of the climate system (and the uncertainties of climate science to which such complexities lead), individually evaluating the thousands of pieces of peer-reviewed evidence that undergird the ‘scientific consensus’ on the issue might not be a realistic expectation of lay, non-technical publics (which UT03 suggested was a daunting task even for people with experience conducting climate research). In the real world, lay publics use institutions (and ideological political fealty to them) as heuristics, and many conservatives are wary of increasing public institutions’ power. As such, conservatives might be more accepting of and willing to engage in discussions of climate science and proposed solutions to climate change if the discussion is framed by and around the private sector and private-sector solutions. Such discussions might lead to greater acceptance of climate science, which could provide a foundation and precedent for consensus building toward policy solutions. As an example, the energy industry, which was identified in the Connecticut, Florida, and Colorado focus groups as playing an important role in climate change, has a potential leadership role to play (and potential money to make) by acknowledging the reality of climate change, addressing it openly and honestly, and leading the transition to a clean-energy future; NGOs and governments, for their part, can play an active role in encouraging them to do so. Additional research might further explore the relationship between proposing private-sector solutions and conservatives’ acceptance of climate science.

This suggestion should not necessarily be interpreted as a concession that, for example, attempts to discuss the IPCC’s findings as ‘normal’ science with conservatives will be futile. Indeed, focus group participants (e.g., UT03, CO01, CO02) expressed a desire to separate the science from the politics, accept the science for what it says, and engage in meaningful debates about personal, political, and business responses rather than arguments about scientific claims they are not qualified to evaluate (see also UT05). (Incidentally, a return to ‘normal empiricism’ generally might help unblock gridlock in many political debates both among elected officials and in lay society.) In Florida, according to FL01 (a local elected official), such progress was already underway, with local and county leaders of different political affiliations agreeing to accept climate science and work together towards solutions. The political calculus apparently changes at the national level, however (Adragna, 2014), suggesting local consensus building might be prerequisite to spurring action at higher levels of government and lending support to a polycentric response (Ostrom, 2014) to climate change. Solutions beginning at the local level are also likely to be more amenable to conservatives wary of concentrating power in centralised public institutions.

Limitations of findings

Given the small number of participants inherent in the focus group research methodology and the potential introduction of bias based on selection methods, this study is not representative, and its results should not be extrapolated or assumed to reflect the broader population of US conservatives. Moreover, as focus groups have not been widely or systematically used in studying US climate change opinion, the results of this study cannot be directly compared to other studies for consistency. This makes this study’s contribution novel but its results difficult to verify directly. Additional focus group studies with US conservatives duplicating (or better, improving) the research method will provide more data points for comparison. Future studies could further refine the selection criteria and perhaps achieve improved homogeneity of participants, for example along religious and gender lines.

Religion

Religious references regarding climate change are also found in the academic literature (Wardekker, Petersen, & van der Sluijs, 2009) as well as in focus group participants’ responses in the present study. US conservatives as a group are highly religious (Pew Research, 2011, 2012), as are a majority of participants in the present study, so it was not surprising to hear participants in the present study discuss religious themes in reference to environmental protection. However, the study’s design did not make an attempt to control for or seek out religious perspectives. Using focus groups to study the role of religion in US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change is an opportunity for further research.

Gender

McCright & Dunlap (2011) and Liu et al. (2013) both find that males tend to be more dismissive of climate science and more likely to believe climate change is not a serious threat. The present study did not control for or target participants based on gender; as such, although gender would be an interesting factor to analyse qualitatively in US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change, an attempt to distinguish climate change conceptions based on gender is beyond the scope of this project and would require additional research.

Conclusion

Examinations of US climate change opinion have, up to the present time, largely been quantitative. Although such research might aptly describe conservatives’ (among others’) opinions, it misses at least two elements of opinions: how those opinions are formed (Kitzinger, 1995) and how ideas are discussed. In this way, qualitative data can inform the policymaking process complementarily, providing deeper insights into conservatives’ motivations for thinking the way they do about climate change. The present study is a preliminary attempt to examine US conservatives’ opinions generally in their conceptions of climate change (and a few related issues) using qualitative methods. It complements the significant body of quantitative research on the topic, providing corroborating evidence for existing claims and proposing additional theories that can be explored both qualitatively and quantitatively.

This study provides empirical evidence that US conservatives’ conceptions of climate change, and the rhetorical strategies they employ in discussing it, vary widely. These findings challenge the traditional stereotypical depiction that broadly equates US conservatives with climate change denial. This study also finds that conservatives do not hesitate to invoke the language of science in justifying their views on climate change, whether to support or refute the scientific consensus. The study finds support to suggest that pursuing private-sector and local responses to climate change might be effective strategies to build consensus and gain conservatives’ support for climate change policy.

Finally, focus group participants in the present study lamented the extent to which politics has infiltrated into the climate change debate and expressed interest in moving forward to discussing solutions. Post-normal climate science might sound intriguing to academic conference attendees, but its prospects as a platform for local consensus building are perhaps less evident. ‘Science aside…’ arguments aside, a return to ‘normal empiricism’, although perhaps hopelessly optimistic in a post-modern, post-normal world, could yield many political benefits, including a depoliticised climate science that can serve as a point of departure for meaningful discussions of individual, business, government, and international action.

[1] A brief examination of the treatment of conservatives’ views regarding climate change in recent US media yields many examples of stereotyping or oversimplifying. For a brief list of examples, see Appendix II.

Appendices

Appendix I: Abstract

Appendix II: Examples of media portrayals of US conservatives’ views on climate change

Liberal political views among US news reporters are well documented (e.g., see Kuypers, 2002:16); as such, finding bias in media coverage is not surprising. Although there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of examples in the media of the way conservatives in the US are portrayed homogenously, collecting an exhaustive list of such articles was not the aim of this study. To illustrate the broader point, below is just a small sampling of the way the media portrays conservatives’ views on climate change:

1. ‘Why Conservatives Deny Climate Change’ (Shireman, 2013) – The article’s title is self-explanatory; the author (or editor) groups conservatives together as denying climate change.

2. ‘How to Tap Latent Conservative Support for Climate-Change Policy’ (McElwee, 2014) – Again, the title supposes conservatives, as a homogenous group, are in fact opposed to climate-change policy. The research outlined in the present study demonstrates conservatives’ views on climate policy are indeed more complex.

3. ‘When Beliefs and Facts Collide’ (Nyhan, 2014) – This article acknowledges a few exceptions to the ‘conservative = climate change sceptic’ rule, but still tends to paint the rest of the group with a single brush stroke.

4. ‘Flavelle: Why Republicans are blind to climate change’ (Flavelle, 2014b) – The article’s title is self-explanatory.

5. ‘“I’m a Republican, and I agree with Obama on climate change”’ (Abrams, 2014) – Here again, the title shows how being a conservative (or Republican in this case) equates to an assumed disbelief in climate change. The research outlined in this paper demonstrates conservatives’ views on climate change are indeed more complex.

Appendix III: Additional Information on Research Ethics and Participant Documents

Prior to the beginning of each focus group, those intending to participate were provided with a Research Information Sheet, an Informed Consent Sheet, and a Participant Information Sheet. [If you are interested in seeing a copy of these documents, please contact Mike at mikeathay@gmail.com.] Participants were asked to fill out the latter two documents participants and return to the researcher before the focus group began. Participants were also offered copies for their own records. All documents returned to the researcher were kept in close personal custody while traveling and have been stored securely since returning from the research trip.

Each focus group was recorded to allow for the creation and analysis of a transcript. To ensure anonymity, participants used only first names during the focus groups, and their names were replaced with codes at the time of transcript creation. As an additional measure to protect participants’ anonymity, town, city, and institutional names connected to the focus groups’ exact locations have been omitted; thus, the focus groups are referred to by the state where they took place. Thus, codes used to refer to individual focus group participants are composed of the US Postal Service abbreviation for the state where the focus group took place plus a two digit number based on participants’ seating location during the focus group (e.g. CT01 (for Connecticut participant 01), FL02 (for Florida participant 02), UT03 (for Utah participant 03), CO04 (for Colorado participant 04), etc.) both in the results summarised below and in the transcripts of participants’ responses in Appendix V. Finally, all focus group recordings and personally identifiable information linking participants to the study will be destroyed according to specifications on the informed consent form.

Finally, on integrity—which hopefully is self-evident—participants were informed before each focus group of the aims and goals of the research; however, as it is not possible to know the results of the research before it is conducted, it could only be explained (and expected) that an honest effort to represent and interpret the data accurately and impartially was of prime importance. As such, every effort has been made, to the extent possible, to report the results and conduct the analysis of the research objectively and fairly.

Appendix IV: Topic Guide

Focus Group Topic Guide

Warm-up Question

What is climate change to you?
- When you hear the words ‘climate change’, what are the first thoughts that come to mind? What images come to mind?

Main Questions

How do you discuss climate change with others?
- Think back to the last time you can recall talking about climate change with someone else. What was the context? What was the content of your discussion? What conclusions did you come to?
How would you characterize the nature of climate science? Why?
- Based on what you’ve read and heard, how would you characterize the nature of climate science? Do you think scientists agree on: whether climate change is happening and whether humans are causing climate change? Do you agree with the scientists on these questions? Why or why not?
How would you characterize the state of clean energy technology? Why?
- When I say clean energy technology, what comes to mind? Based on what you’ve read and heard, how would you characterize the state of clean energy technology? What role, if any, do you think the government should play in helping the development and spread of clean energy technology?
What role, if any, should individuals, businesses, governments, and international organisations play in responding to climate change?
- First, should individuals, businesses, governments, and international organisations be involved in responding to climate change? Why (not)? Second, if yes, what specific actions should they take?

Ending Question

Do you have any thoughts on climate change that have not yet been covered in the previous questions that you would like to share?

Appendix V: Transcript of Participant Responses

If you are interested in a complete transcript of participant responses, please contact Mike at mikeathay@gmail.com.

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